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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this
matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) . This appeal was poured
over to the Court of Appeals by the Supreme Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE MUTUAL RELEASE WAS NOT
ENFORCEABLE IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND
NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS.
1.

The trial court's legal conclusion that the release was
unenforceable because there was not a meeting of the
minds as to what consideration was being given in
exchange for the release is a misapplication of the
doctrine of "meeting of the minds."

2.

The trial court's ruling that there was no meeting of the
minds as to the consideration being given is an illogical
conclusion given the trial court's factual finding that
Hartmark provided the consideration being claimed by VPV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO
SUPPORT THE RELEASE WAS INADEQUATE WAS CONTRARY TO THE WELLSETTLED CASE LAW IN UTAH.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING HARTMARK RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
$10,370 CHECK MADE OUT TO SCHREYER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE THAT HARTMARK PERSONALLY BENEFITTED FROM ANY CLAIMED
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY.
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING HARTMARK TO REPAY THE
$10,000 CHECK FOR HIS COMPENSATION FOR HIS EFFORTS IN SETTING
UP VPV WHEN THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT
AMONG THE PRINCIPALS OF VPV THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO AN AMOUNT
IN EXCESS OF THE CHECK.

X.

THE TRIAL COURT USED AN ERRONEOUS METHOD TO CALCULATE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF THE CELLULAR PHONE AND THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO MAKE THE PROPER CALCULATION.

XI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO VPV WHEN
THERE HAD NEVER BEEN A DETERMINATION OF ENTITLEMENT TO FEES.

XII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING VPV THE COSTS OF ITS
DEPOSITIONS.
XIII.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER WRITTEN FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
XI.

HARTMARK IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL AND
ON APPEAL DUE TO VPV'S BREACH OF THE RELEASE.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are none.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
This appeal

is from a final judgment

appellee, VIDEO PUBLISHING VENTURES, INC.,

in favor of

(hereafter "VPV"),

following a bench trial in the Third District Court before Judge
Glenn Iwasaki.
VPV was a video production company which was operating
out of the Osmond Studio in Orem. The company was originally based
in Colorado before it was purchased and moved to Utah. Appellant
Hartmark was involved in the purchase and reorganization and
relocation of VPV and became the financial Vice President.

His

duties included paying the debts of the company.
After several years of unprofitable operations, VPV was
in financial difficulties. Internal disputes over management arose
between Hartmark and Sterling Martell, President of VPV. Hartmark
decided to resign.

Shortly thereafter, VPV ran out of money and

ceased operations. Over two years later, VPV brought this lawsuit
against Hartmark, et al.,1 claiming that Hartmark owed VPV money
for alleged misconduct during his employment.
Hartmark originally brought a Motion to Dismiss claiming
that Sterling Martell was not entitled to pursue the action against
him on behalf of VPV.

That motion was unsuccessful.

VPV sought

attorney fees for successfully defending against the motion. Judge
Scott Daniels, who was originally assigned to this case and
subsequently retired from the bench, did not award attorney fees at
l

.
The remaining defendants settled their disputes with VPV
prior to trial and are not parties to this appeal.
- 2-

that time but rather, took the question of attorney fees under
advisement.

The case was subsequently assigned to Judge Iwasaki.

At the close of appellee's case, appellant Hartmark moved
to dismiss based on a general release signed by both Hartmark and
VPV on the day Hartmark resigned as Vice President of VPV.

The

release mutually released each party from any and all claims
against the other "and more specifically a cause of action arising
out of Mr. Hartmark's employment as an officer of VPV."

The

release was drafted by VPV's attorney who advised VPV to sign the
release and was present when it was signed.
VPV argued that the release was not enforceable because
VPV signed it under "financial or economical duress." VPV claimed
that Hartmark would not surrender certain company records in his
possession as Vice President, particularly the company checkbook,
until he was given a release. Appellee also claimed that there was
no consideration given for the release because the records and
checkbook, which Hartmark purportedly exchanged for the release,
belonged to VPV.
Hartmark

disputed

appellee's

factual

claim that he

refused to surrender the company records in his control until he
was given the release. He also countered VPV's claim of "financial
duress" by showing that the Utah Supreme Court has previously ruled
that "financial duress" is not a ground for setting aside a
release.

He countered the "lack of consideration" argument by

showing that the Utah Supreme Court has held that mutual releases
are, in and of themselves, adequate consideration.

- 3-

The trial court, nevertheless, denied Hartmark's Motion
to Dismiss by ruling that the release was not an enforceable
contract because there was not a meeting of the minds as to the
consideration and that the consideration was inadequate,
pages 265-67 of the transcript for the trial court's ruling.)

(See
The

trial court then proceeded with the trial and ultimately dismissed
many of the claims against Hartmark, but held that Hartmark should
repay VPV on a few of the claims and entered judgment against
Hartmark for $18,689.68.
Hartmark claims that the trial court erred in refusing to
enforce the general release and that the entire judgment should be
reversed and all of VPV's claims be dismissed as barred by the
release.

In the alternative, Hartmark claims that the trial court

made several errors in holding him liable to VPV on each of the
individual claims.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Pursuant to the terms of his employment agreement

with VPV, Hartmark was entitled to a salary and reimbursement of
expenses

as

Chairman

of

the Board

of Directors

and

President of VPV in charge of VPV's financial affairs.

as Vice

(Trans, pp.

211, 213, 285-86)
2.

As the financial officer, Hartmark was responsible

for signing virtually all checks on behalf of VPV.

(Trans, pp. 80,

174)
3.

The officers of VPV agreed in December, 1988, that

Hartmark was entitled to receive $11,208 as compensation for his
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efforts expended in 1988 in creating VPV, as well as reimbursement
for his expenses incurred.
4.

(Trans, pp. 289-90)

Hartmark signed Check No. 1177, made out to himself,

in the amount of $10,3 70, to compensate himself for his efforts,
and reimburse his expenses, in setting up VPV, pursuant to the
December

1988 agreement

entitled to $11,208.
5.
majority

of

the officers of VPV,

that he was

(Trans, pp. 83-88 and D-Ex. 22)

Echochem
VPV's

of

was

stock

a

and

holding
was

company

owned

by

which

Sterling

owned

a

Martell,

President of VPV, Hartmark, Hugo Gardner, a Director of VPV, Sig
Schreyer, and Peter Hirschberg.
6.

(Trans, pg. 170)

Echochem borrowed $10,000 from Schreyer to make a

payment to Eva Heiner for stock of another company it was purchasing from Heiner.
7.

(Trans, pg. 170)

VPV owed Echochem an amount greater than the amount

Echochem owed to Schreyer.
8.

(Trans, pg. 424)

Hartmark, Gardner and VPV's attorney, Ron Vance, met

and discussed whether VPV could repay the debt to Schreyer, and
Vance gave his approval since VPV owed Echochem money.

(Trans, pp.

375, 424)
9.

Hartmark wrote Check No. 1217 to Sig Schreyer, in

the amount of $10,370, to repay the debt of Echochem to Schreyer.
(P-Ex. 1)
10.

Vance, as VPV's legal counsel, did not believe that

the check to Schreyer was in any way illegal, but was perhaps
simply an accounting error.

(Trans, pp. 439-40)
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11.

Hartmark resigned from his position as the Vice

President of VPV on June 2, 1989,
12.

Hartmark admitted that he took a cellular telephone

and desk with him when he left VPV in exchange for other personal
property belonging to him which was needed by VPV.
13.

(Trans, pg. 98)

Gardner, as a director of VPV, requested that Vance

prepare a general mutual release for Hartmark, and Vance prepared
the release which was paid for by VPV.

(Trans, pp. 107-109, 381-

82, 420)
14.

On the day that Hartmark resigned, Hartmark and

Martell, on behalf of VPV, entered into and signed the mutual
release prepared by Vance wherein Hartmark and VPV, in exchange for
the mutual release of the other, released each other from any and
all claims each may have against the other.
15.

(D-Ex. 21)

The release stated as follows:
GENERAL RELEASE

Video Publishing Ventures, Inc., a Colorado
corporation ("VPV"), and Stan Hartmark, for
and in mutual consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged,
have remised, released, and forever discharged
and by these presents do for each other, their
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns,
remise, release and forever discharge each
other their heirs, executors, administrators,
successors and assigns of and from all and any
manner of action and actions, cause and causes
of action, suits, debts, dues, sums of money,
accounts, reckonings, bonds, bills, specialties, covenants, contracts, controversies,
agreements, promises, variances, trespasses,
damages, judgments, executions, claims, and
demands whatsoever, in law, or in equity,
which against either party the other ever had,
now has or which the heirs, executors, or
administrators of either party, hereafter can,
shall or may have for, upon or by reason of
any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the
- 6-

beginning of the world to the date of these
presents and more specifically a cause of
action arising out of Mr. Hartmark's employment as an officer of VPV.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have
executed this General Release at Salt Lake
City, Utah, on this 2nd day of June, 1989.
VIDEO PUBLISHING VENTURES, INC.

by

Lsl

Sterling Martell, President

Isl
Stan Hartmark, Individually
16.

Hartmark never told either Martell or Owens that he

would not surrender the checkbook, he claimed that he did not have
the checkbook.
17.

(Trans, pp. 120-21, 220)
Vance told Martell and Owens that they could not

obtain the checkbook until VPV signed the release.

(Trans, pp.

120-21, 220)
18.

Hartmark signed the release at Vance's office after

which time Martell signed the release at the direction of Tom
Owens, a consultant to VPV, while sitting in Vance's automobile at
the Draper off-ramp of 1-15.
19.

(Trans, pg. 122)

Immediately after signing the release, Martell and

Owens went to Vance's office and were given VPV's checkbook by
either Vance or his secretary.
20.

(Trans, pg. 155)

The trial court found that Hartmark had in fact

refused to surrender VPV's checkbook until VPV signed the release
because it did not believe that it was a coincidence that the
checkbook was available at Vance's office immediately after the
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signing of the release by Martell.

(Trans, pg. 4 - Trial Court's

Ruling)
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellee

filed

suit

against

Stanley

R.

Hartmark

to

determine Hartmark's liability to appellee regarding Hartmark's
conduct as an officer and director of the appellee corporation,
more specifically, a claim that Hartmark owed VPV money for alleged
misconduct during his employment.
Hartmark originally brought a Motion to Dismiss claiming
that appellant was not entitled to pursue the action against him
based upon the theory that the representatives of appellant did not
have authority

to bring

officer of appellant.

the action against another

corporate

That motion was denied.
FINAL DISPOSITION

After a two day bench trial, a final judgment was entered
against Hartmark.

Hartmark appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Each error asserted in this case is a legal error and is,
therefore, to be reviewed by the Court for correctness, requiring
no deference to the trial court's rulings.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There were several errors committed by the trial court in
its application of the law to the facts presented in this case, any
of which requires reversal of the trial court's awarding judgment
to VPV.
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(1)

The

trial

court's

ruling

that

the

mutual

release was not enforceable is contrary to established legal
principles and not supported by its factual findings,
(2)

The trial court's conclusion that the consider-

ation given to support the release was inadequate was contrary
to the well-settled case law in Utah.
(3)

The

trial

court

erred

in holding

Hartmark

responsible for the $10,370 check made out to Schreyer because
there was no evidence that Hartmark personally benefitted from
any claimed breach of fiduciary duty.
(4)

The trial court erred in requiring Hartmark to

repay the $10,000 check for his compensation for his efforts
in setting up VPV when the testimony was that there was an
agreement among the principals of VPV that he was entitled to
an amount in excess of the check.
(5)

The trial court used an erroneous method to

calculate plaintiff's damages for conversion of the cellular
phone and there was no evidence submitted to make the proper
calculation.
(6)

The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees

to VPV when there had never been a determination of entitlement to fees.
(7)

The trial court erred in awarding VPV the costs

of its depositions.
(8)

The trial court erred in refusing to enter

written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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(9) Hartmark is entitled to costs and attorney fees
at trial and on appeal due to VPV's breach of the release.
Any of the foregoing errors, with the exception of the
award of attorney fees, standing alone, requires complete reversal
of the trial court's judgment in the VPV's favor*
CALENDARING
If, in accordance with established case law, the trial
court's failure to enforce the mutual release is reversed and the
judgment reversed, this appeal may clearly be dealt with in an
unpublished opinion. It would, on the other hand, require new law
to uphold the trial court's ruling that the release was unenforceable, and therefore would require a published opinion if the trial
court is affirmed on that question. Furthermore, if the release is
not upheld, and the alternative arguments must be addressed, there
are questions in the remaining issues dealing with specific awards
by the trial court which would require published opinion since they
involve the creation of new law.

In particular, the questions

concerning the trial court's finding that there was a breach of
fiduciary when there was no personal benefit proved and the
question of whether VPV's settlement with Sig Schreyer constituted
an accord and satisfaction of any claim concerning Hartmark. Other
various rulings by the trial court would also require a published
opinion if they are upheld since they would constitute new law at
odds with existing law.
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ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT#S RULING THAT THE MUTUAL RELEASE WAS NOT
ENFORCEABLE IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND
NOT SUPPORTED BY ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS.
When Hartmark claimed that the mutual release barred

VPV's claims against him, the trial court denied the motion, ruling
that there was no meeting of the minds as to the consideration
being given by Hartmark in exchange for the release and that the
consideration given for the release was inadequate.
ruled from the bench:
In this matter there seems to be primarily,
number 1, a nonmeeting of the minds, therefore, it is not a mutual agreement that was
entered into between the parties. The testimony which is prevailing in this matter from
plaintiffs was that the reason why they had
executed this general release was to secure
the books and financial records as well as the
checkbook in question, and although it was
partially due to financial stress, that was
their main motivation for signing the release.
On the other hand, as was argued very effectively but to no avail by Mr. Bond, that the
release was a mutual release based upon certain consideration that was given up by the
plaintiff, meaning that they would not go
after further action against the defendant and
also the defendant would waive any further
action against the plaintiff, if necessary.
With those two positions it seemed very apparent that there was not a meeting of the minds
as to what was contemplated by the release,
what consideration if any was given.
Issue of Consideration. The Court has to look
at the sufficiency or even adequacy of the
consideration.
The court is convinced the
consideration, if any at all, would be the
return of certain property which was rightfully the property of the plaintiff in the
first place, therefore, it is insufficient
consideration in that sense.
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The court

1.

The trial court's legal conclusion that the release was
unenforceable because there was not a meeting of the
minds as to what consideration was being given in
exchange for the release is a misapplication of the
doctrine of "meeting of the minds.11
The trial court ruled, on its own initiative, that there

was no meeting of the minds as to the consideration being exchanged
for the release.2

This was a misapplication of the doctrine.

The meeting of the minds doctrine requires that the
parties agree as to the terms of the contract, i.e., what is
expected of the parties.

"Contractual mutual assent requires

assent by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that
their minds meet as to all the terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer,
575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978).

.
VPV never claimed in the presentation of its case that
there was not a meeting of the minds on the consideration for the
release. See Trans, pg 243-57 for VPV's arguments as to why the
release was unenforceable. The trial court on its own initiative
created the "meeting of the minds" argument for VPV, and then ruled
favorably upon its own theory.
It is well settled that a tribunal may not raise theories
on behalf of a party. Trial courts may not base their rulings on
issues which are not "an expressed or implied part of [a party's]
theory." Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Utah State Tax Commission, 847
P.2d 418 (Utah App. 1993).
The sua sponte raising of theories
causes the tribunal to depart from its passive, impartial role and
become an active advocate on behalf of one of the parties.
The interests of justice are not enhanced
when the court exceeds its role as arbiter by
reaching out and deciding an issue that would
otherwise be dead, it not having been litigated at the time of trial.
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983).
At no time in the present case did VPV ever attack the
release for a lack of a meeting of the minds. Had the trial court
not raised the theory sua sponte, it would never have been raised
by VPV, since VPV had already rested its case. Any "meeting of the
minds" challenge to the release was waived by VPV because VPV did
not raise it. Since the trial court's ruling was beyond the theory
presented by VPV, it was a nullity and should be summarily
reversed. Chevron, 847 P.2d 418.
- 12 -

There was no dispute in this case as to the written terms
of the release and what the release formally requires of the parties.

It unequivocally provides that each party was releasing the

other from all claims.

The release was plain and unambiguous on

its face, and therefore should have been enforced as written. John
Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah
1987) .
The trial court's failure to recognize the unambiguous
meeting of the minds of Hartmark and VPV as recorded on the face of
the release was reversible legal error in and of itself, and is
grounds for a reversal in this case without any further discussion.
We will, nevertheless, address the flaws of the trial court's
analysis to assist the Court.
The trial court's confusion arose when it violated the
parole evidence rule and looked beyond the face of the release and
tried to determine why the parties were willing to enter into the
release.

It concluded, erroneously, that there was not a meeting

of the minds because there was an additional, unwritten, reason for
VPV entering into the release.
The trial court believed VPV's testimony that Hartmark
refused to surrender the checkbook unless he received a mutual
release, and that the "main motivation" of VPV in signing the
release was to recover the checkbook. This factual finding was in
direct conflict with Hartmark's testimony at trial that he did not
have the checkbook in his possession at the relevant times, and
that he did not demand the release before he would surrender the
checkbook.
- 13 -

Somehow, the trial court concluded that since Hartmark
testified that he did not demand the release in exchange for the
checkbook, and VPV claimed that he did demand the release in
exchange for the checkbook, that there was no meeting of the minds
as to what consideration was being given by Hartmark in exchange
for the release and, therefore, the release is unenforceable. This
conclusion is a clear misapplication of the "meeting of the minds"
doctrine.
This difference in perception, as to whether Hartmark
promised to surrender the checkbook in exchange for the release,
does not mean that the parties did not have a "meeting of the
minds."

From an analytical standpoint, the fact that Hartmark

provided the full consideration claimed by VPV makes any dispute
over whether the parties had a meeting of the minds moot.
The meeting of the minds doctrine arises when a party
refuses to perform an alleged term of a contract because the party
claims it did not agree to perform that term.

The doctrine then

excuses the protesting party from performance of the disputed term
under the theory that the disputed term was never agreed upon.
If a disputed

term has already been performed, or

consideration provided as in this case, there is no need to utilize
the doctrine. There is no need to excuse Hartmark from delivering
the checkbook when VPV has already been given the checkbook. Any
lack of a meeting of the minds as to what consideration was being
given for the release was cured on June 2, 1989, when VPV actually
received the checkbook.

Consequently, any question as to whether
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the parties had a meeting of the minds regarding the checkbook was
rendered moot.
By applying the meeting of the minds doctrine to this
case, the trial court has not excused any performance of a disputed
term. Rather, the trial court has allowed VPV to refuse to perform
its part of the bargain after Hartmark has fully provided all
consideration required from him.

This inequitable result is

clearly not an appropriate application of the doctrine.
2.

The trial court's ruling that there
minds as to the consideration being
conclusion given the trial court's
Hartmark provided the consideration

was no meeting of the
given is an illogical
factual finding that
being claimed by VPV.

(Trans, pp. 22-24 of closing arguments)
The apparent inconsistency in expectations as to the consideration being given for the release is also immaterial in this case
because the discrepancy is eliminated by the trial court's factual
finding that Hartmark, contrary to his testimony, did in fact
refuse to surrender the checkbook until after the release was
signed.

In other words, the trial court found that Hartmark

expected to deliver both his promise to forbear and the checkbook
in exchange for the release, and VPV expected to receive both
Hartmark's promise to forbear and the checkbook in exchange for the
release.
Based on the trial court's factual findings, there was no
inconsistency between the mindsets of the two parties to the
contract.

Both expected, and in fact received, the exact consid-

eration for which the trial court found they bargained.
a meeting of the minds.

They had

The only logical conclusion the trial
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court could make is that there was a meeting of the minds as to
what consideration was given.
The trial court's ruling that there was not a meeting of
the minds is not only a misapplication of the doctrine, it is
contrary to its own factual findings that Hartmark and VPV had the
same mindset.3
II.

It must, therefore, be reversed.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO
SUPPORT THE RELEASE WAS INADEQUATE WAS CONTRARY TO THE WELLSETTLED CASE LAW IN UTAH. (Trans, pg. 241)
In ruling that there was inadequate consideration given

for the release, the trial court stated:
The court is convinced the consideration, if
any at all, would be the return of certain
property which was rightfully the property of
the plaintiff in the first place; therefore it
is insufficient consideration in that sense.
(Trans, pg. 267)
Even assuming that the return of VPV's property, standing
alone, would not constitute adequate consideration to support the
release, there is other adequate consideration to support the
release.

The trial court's legal conclusion totally ignores,

Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and
given in exchange for a promise. Simmons v. California
Institute of Technology, 34 Cal. 2d 264, 272, 209 P.2d
581, 586 (1949); See Colorado National Bank of Denver v.
Bohm, 286 F.2d 494, 496 (9th Cir. 1961) . Promises made by
a party pursuant to a bilateral contract to do an act or
to forbear from doing an act that would be detrimental to
the promisor or beneficial to the promisee may constitute
the consideration for the other's promise. Sugarhouse
Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980);
Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 613, 237 P.2d
823, 825 (1951) . For the mutual promises of the parties
to a bilateral contract to constitute the consideration
for each other, the promises must be binding on both parties. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin. 1 F.2d 687, 688
(3d Cir. 1924).
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without any legal basis or explanation, the unambiguous written
mutual promises of VPV and Hartmark to release all claims and
forbear from suing each other.

Such mutual promises, without

anything more, are clearly adequate consideration for each other as
a matter of law. Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 613,
237 P.2d 823, 825 (1951). The Court expressly held in Allen that,
"mutual promises in each of which the promisor undertakes some act
of forbearance that will be, or apparently may be, detrimental to
the promisor or beneficial to the promisee and neither of which are
void, are 'sufficient consideration' for one another."

Id.

Hartmark, by signing the release, promised to forbear
from suing VPV. This was a promise detrimental to him and beneficial to VPV.4

His promise to forbear, therefore, constitutes

adequate consideration for VPV's promise to forbear -- even if the
surrender of the checkbook is not included as consideration.

The

trial court's failure to recognize the legal effect of the mutual
promises was an error of law which must be reversed.
Inasmuch as the trial court's ruling that there was no
meeting of the minds was a misapplication of the doctrine, and its
conclusion that there was no adequate consideration to support the
release violated well-established Utah law, the trial court's
ruling that the release was not valid was erroneous.

The trial

court's failure to dismiss VPV's complaint was therefore reversible

4

.
VPV should be estopped from asserting that the release is
unenforceable. Hartmark has honored his promise to forbear and did
not bring various claims which he could have asserted against VPV.
Had he done so, such claims could have offset the judgment awarded
against him. To allow VPV to now renege on its promise to not
bring any action against Hartmark is inequitable.
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error.

Hartmark is entitled to have the entire judgment against

him reversed.
Hartmark argues in the alternative that the trial court
erred in reaching each of the awards as set forth below.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING HARTMARK RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
CHECK MADE OUT TO SCHREYER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT
HARTMARK PERSONALLY BENEFITTED FROM ANY CLAIMED BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY. (Trans, pp. 18-19 of closing arguments)
Echochem owed $10,000 to Schreyer, but it didn't have the
money to pay him.

VPV owed Echochem more than enough to pay the

debt to Schreyer.

Hartmark, along with Gardner, consulted VPV's

attorney who advised him that it was permissible for VPV to pay
Echochem's debt to Schreyer so Hartmark made out Check No. 1217,
payable to Schreyer in the amount of $10,370.

VPV claimed that

this was a breach of his fiduciary duty without ever explaining how
it was a breach.
VPV's own attorney testified that in his legal opinion
there was nothing illegal about the payment to Schreyer, only that
the manner of repayment was "sloppy" from an accounting point of
view.

(Trans, pp. 439-40)

testimony by VPV.

There was no contradiction of this

Hartmark merely followed his lawyer's advice.

Without any legal analysis or support for its conclusion,
the

trial

payment.

court

held

that

Hartmark

had made

an

unauthorized

The trial court never explained how this amounted to a

breach of his fiduciary duty.

Nor is there any legal explanation

as to why Hartmark should be personally liable for writing the
check to Schreyer when VPV failed to prove that Hartmark personally
benefited from the check to Schreyer.
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If Hartmark did not receive

any personal benefit from the check, where is his conflict of
interest that would constitute a breach of his fiduciary duty?
As a matter of law, Hartmark did not breach any fiduciary
duty.

He acted on the advice of VPV's attorney.

At best, he may

have made a mistake in judgment, but such mistakes in business
judgment do not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty so as to
create personal liability.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING HARTMARK TO REPAY THE
$10#000 CHECK FOR HIS COMPENSATION FOR HIS EFFORTS IN SETTING
UP VPV WHEN THE TESTIMONY WAS THAT THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT
AMONG THE PRINCIPALS OF VPV THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO AN AMOUNT
IN EXCESS OF THE CHECK. (Trans, pp. 14-16 of closing argument)
The trial court ruled that there was "no competent

evidence" that Hartmark was entitled to $10,000 in compensation and
reimbursement for his efforts in setting up VPV, and therefore
required him to repay the $10,000 check. The ruling is contrary to
the evidence presented by Hartmark, Gardner, and Vance that there
was an agreement between the principals of VPV that he was entitled
to more than $10,000, evidenced in a memorandum, which was introduced without objection into evidence as exhibit D-22.

Such

evidence was clearly competent. Whether or not evidence is competent is a legal question, reviewable for correctness. Since there
was not any objection to the competency of the evidence of the
agreement, the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT USED AN ERRONEOUS METHOD TO CALCULATE PLAINTIFFS DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF THE CELLULAR PHONE AND THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO MAKE THE PROPER CALCULATION.
(Trans, pg. 20 of closing arguments)
The

trial

court

found

that Hartmark

converted

the

cellular telephone and awarded damages in the amount of $950. The
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trial court took the purchase price -- $1,000 -- and subtracted the
value of the phone at the time of trial -- $50.

(Trans, pg. 3 of

trial court's ruling) This is not the appropriate method of determining damages.
The Court of Appeals explained in Henderson v. For-Shor
Co. , 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1988), that the appropriate
measure of damages for conversion is the fair market value of the
property at the time of the conversion. "[I]n order to be entitled
to recover his actual damages, the claimant must provide some
competent evidence of the property's fair market value at the time
and place of conversion."

Frost v. Eggeman. 638 P.2d 141, 144

(Wyo. 1981).
Since there was absolutely no evidence introduced at
trial as to the fair market value at the time of the conversion,
plaintiff, VPV, failed to prove its case.

VPV conceded in its

closing arguments that they were going from the new price of
$1,000.

(Trans, pg. 29 of closing arguments)

Consequently it is

not entitled to any damages for it alleged conversion of the telephone.

The trial court's erroneous award should therefore be

reversed.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO VPV WHEN
THERE HAD NEVER BEEN A DETERMINATION OF ENTITLEMENT TO FEES.
(Trans, pg. 485)
This case was originally assigned to Judge Daniels who

entertained a motion by Hartmark to dismiss for lack of corporate
authority to bring the lawsuit. Hartmark's motion was unsuccessful
because Judge Daniels held there was a question of fact.

VPV

sought attorney fees claiming that the motion was frivolous. Judge
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Daniels took the request for attorney fees under advisement for
later determination depending on the success of the factual claim.
Hartmark was unsuccessful on the facts so VPV renewed its
request for attorney fees.

Without any ruling as to why VPV was

entitled to attorney fees, Judge Iwasaki set the amount of fees at
$500, There has never been a determination and/or ruling that VPV
is entitled to any fees. An award of fees without a determination
as to entitlement, is erroneous as a matter of law.

Dixie State

Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) . The trial court's award
of $500 in legal fees should therefore be reversed.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING VPV THE COSTS OP ITS
DEPOSITIONS. (Record pg. 484)
The trial court erroneously awarded VPV $682.20 for the
depositions of Hartmark and Gardner, and for copy costs of the
depositions of its own witnesses, Martell and Owens. It is wellsettled law in Utah that deposition costs are not recoverable
unless the depositions "appeared essential for the development and
presentation of the case.

Morgan v. Morgan. 795 P.2d 684 (Utah

App. 1990). Depositions are necessary only when the complex nature
of the case prevent a party from completing discovery through less
expensive means.

Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing.

Ltd. , 753 P.2d 507, 512 (Utah App. 1988) .

The party seeking

recovery of deposition costs has the burden of proving the
necessity of the deposition.

VPV presented no explanation as to

why it could not have performed discovery through less expensive
means such as interrogatories and request for production of
documents.

At best, VPV merely claimed that the depositions were

in fact used and were helpful. This does not satisfy VPV's burden
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of proof.

Consequently the award of deposition costs should be

reversed.5
VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER WRITTEN FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. (Record pg. 481)
The trial court entered its rulings from the bench with

minimal out findings.

Its rulings did not address or resolve many

of the disputed facts in this case, nor do they set forth the trial
court's full analysis. The trial court's rulings are ambiguous and
incomplete in many respects.

It is a denial of due process for a

tribunal to not enter adequate findings that reveal the trial
court's analytical process in reaching its decision.

Adams v.

Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App.
1991).

Whether the findings are adequate is a question of law

which this Court may review for error.

Id.

Many of the factual

disputes in this case have more than one possible resolution.
Given such a "matrix" of possible findings, the trial court's
findings may not be implied.

Id.

Hartmark specifically requested

that VPV set forth complete findings of fact, but VPV refused. Any
lack of findings should therefore be found or implied in Hartmark's
favor.
IX,

HARTMARK IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES AT TRIAL AND
ON APPEAL DUE TO VPV f S BREACH OF THE RELEASE.
(Record pg.
435; Trans, pg. 258)
Hartmark requested attorney fees below, as damages for

VPV's filing of this case in contravention of the release, but was

.
VPV claim $106.95 in copying costs for copies of the
depositions of its own witnesses. Such a claim is totally without
legal support in the code, the rules of civil procedure, or case
law. Even if the costs of the depositions are allowed on appeal,
the award must be reduced by the $106.95 copying costs.
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denied based on the trial court's erroneous ruling that the release
was unenforceable-

Hartmark renews that request at this time, and

he requests his attorney fees and costs on appeal should he prevail
in reversing the trial court's ruling invalidating the release. As
a direct result of VPV's filing of the suit below, in contravention
of the release, Hartmark has been forced to incur attorney fees
below and on appeal, which fees are a reasonably foreseeable consequence of VPV's breach of the release.
An appellant which prevails on appeal, may be awarded
attorney fees as part of the appeal even though the appellant was
not awarded fees below if the appellant would have been entitled to
fees below had the trial court made the proper ruling as determined
on appeal. AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Dev. & Energy. 714 P.2d 289
(Utah 1986).

Had the trial court properly applied the law below

and recognized the validity of the release, Hartmark would have
been entitled to his attorney fees as a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of VPV's breach of the release. Hartmark, therefore,
respectfully requests an award of fees should he prevail.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's invalidation of the General Release
agreement was a misapplication of the doctrine of the meeting of
the minds.

It was also contrary to the factual findings of the

trial court which showed that both parties expected, and in fact
received, the exact same consideration. The trial court's conclusion that there was not adequate consideration to support the
release is directly contrary to Utah case law which states that
mutual promises to forbear constitute consideration for each other
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without any additional consideration.

The entire judgment should

therefore be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to
allow the trial court to determine Hartmark's damages, including
attorney fees at trial and on appeal, for VPV's breach of the
release.
If the Court concludes that the release was unenforceable, then Hartmark argues that the trial court committed error
with respect to each award which require that each award be
reversed individually as specifically set forth above.
DATED this 13th day of April, 1995.
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